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Abstract  
Reliable and secure information exchange, which is crucial for successful response to crisis by 
humanitarian organizations, requires the responding groups to swiftly organize themselves in new and 
dynamic ways. Within these resulting impromptu structures, planning, negotiation, and coordination 
poses significant problems, due to the heterogeneity of the technologies in place. A plethora of technical 
solutions have been proposed to solve information exchange issues. However, they thought of security as 
an ad-hoc, especially authentication, authorization, and access control. This paper proposes a conceptual 
platform, the Secured Humanitarian Information Sharing Architecture (SHISA), that enables 
heterogeneous humanitarian systems to exchange information while considering authentication, 
authorization, and access control. SHISA standardizes communication through the exchange of encrypted 
XML documents. It uses the Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI) for authentication and 
authorization. The platform utilizes the mechanisms of indexing and impersonation to control data access 
so that humanitarian organizations' users access only the information they need. 
Keywords  
Humanitarian Communication, Security, Privilege Management Infrastructure, Indexing, Impersonation. 
Introduction 
Effective communication is essential for successful coordination and response to crisis, whether natural or 
man-made. It helps in saving money and time that humanitarian organizations might otherwise spend on 
duplicate efforts (Huesemann 2006). Effective information exchange also helps humanitarian agencies 
build partnerships, increase trust, and allows the sharing of resources, which are indispensable 
characteristics of constructive coordination in response to crisis (Wakolbinger et al. 2013). Most of all, 
information and communication during crisis play an important role in logistics, organizational learning, 
health-care delivery, and other humanitarian services (Haselkorn and Walton 2009).  
According to King (2005), humanitarian information can be categorized into: 1) situational awareness 
information which reports the on-the-ground situation in terms of condition of crisis, needs, location, and 
severity. 2) operational information which help planning and implementing assistance programs such as 
the stakeholders, the financial reports, among others. 3) background information about the crisis 
country’s culture, geography, population, and political structure. Finally, 4) analysis information that 
include evaluations of causes, constraints, efficiency factors, and recommendations. 
Problems in humanitarian organizations’ communication are categorized as cultural issues that stem from 
the environment surrounding the organizations, organizational issues that are related to the operational 
level inside the organizations, and technical issues that emanate from the variations in the capabilities of 
the technologies in use by the organizations. Cultural and organizational issues are critical to overcome 
and troublesome due to the complexity of changing people habits and presuppositions. Technical issues 
however, can obstruct information exchange utterly. Therefore, we argue that technical issues require to 
be prioritized due to their inhibiting nature. 
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In this paper, we focus on the technical issue of heterogeneity of the technologies in place, which hinders 
the exchange process and access control mechanisms. Heterogeneity may stem from technologies are 
running on different operating systems, data based on different formats, or software programmed in 
different programming languages, among others (Bouguettaya et al. 2012). The lack of standardization 
can cause interoperability issues; furthermore, controlling access within this environment is challenging 
since it relies on the management software. For example, one organization may use document 
management software while another organization uses relational database software. The former allows 
access control at the file or document level, whereas the latter controls access at the individual data 
element or field level (Lampel et al. 2013). Although technologies that allow heterogeneous systems to 
communicate have been proposed in the literature, to the best of our knowledge, security and access 
control have not been studied explicitly. Therefore, the objective of our paper is to develop a platform that 
allows heterogeneous information technologies to communicate and exchange just the right amount of 
data required by each humanitarian stakeholder to achieve its tasks. Our proposed system is a loosely 
coupled mediator-wrapper framework that incorporates mechanisms for standardizing the information to 
be exchanged through XML. It also authenticates and authorizes participants through the Privilege 
Management Infrastructure (PMI) (Chadwick et al. 2003) and restricts access for humanitarian 
information through indexing and impersonation (Lampel et al. 2013).  
We address the following research questions: What technical architecture can enable heterogeneous 
humanitarian organizations to effectively exchange information? And what access control techniques can 
be utilized so that the organizations only access the information they need in order to make the right 
decisions and to achieve effective crisis response? We use a design science approach, focusing on solving a 
problem identified in the literature (Peffers et al. 2007). Defining the problem is the first step in the 
design, followed by illustrating the objective of the designed artifact (Hevner et al. 2004). Thus, the 
following section gives the contextual background of the humanitarian information exchange by pointing 
out the information sharing impediments. The section also presents the architectures for integrating 
heterogeneous technologies proposed in the literature and their drawbacks. The issues discussed in the 
section comprise the building blocks for our proposed framework. In the section following, we describe 
our artifact – the Secured Humanitarian Information Sharing Architecture (SHISA), which synthesizes 
and builds upon suggested solutions in various silos of the literature. The final section provides some 
discussion and conclusions.  
Research Background  
Humanitarian information sharing issues can be classified as organizational, technical, and cultural. 
Technical problems are related to issues in infrastructure (i.e. lack of adequate infrastructure at the time 
of crisis in the area in which the crisis is taking place), the heterogeneity of information systems (i.e. 
issues of interoperability of technologies and data structures), deficiencies in information availability (i.e. 
processing data, consolidating data from different sources, and effective access control), the differences in 
security level requirements between the organizations involved, and the different levels of information 
required by the stakeholders. Some organizations may require all available information, while others may 
need on specific elements. Hence, access should be controlled so that an organization receives all the 
information it needs and only the information it needs to accomplish its tasks (Haselkorn and Walton 
2009; Celik and Corbacioglu 2010; Altay and Labonte 2014; Clark et al. 2015).  The disaster response to 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York City, which involved 1,067 governmental and non-governmental 
organizations, illustrates these technical difficulties Incompatible radio systems hindered the information 
flow in the critical hours following the attacks (Singh et al. 2009, p. 285). Consequently, “in the three 
months following that event, the death toll went from 6,000 to 3,040, and most of the reduction has been 
traced to … ‘duplicate reports and confusion in the hours and day immediately following the attack,’ which 
for our purposes, corresponds to multiple databases and inconsistencies in reporting and updating 
information” (Phillips et al. 2002, p. 88).  
The literature offers various architectures to integrate heterogeneous information systems, classified into 
layered architectures (e.g. Da Xu et al. 2014; Sanaei et al. 2014; Botta et al. 2016), extension architectures 
(e.g. Li 2010), and loosely coupled architectures (e.g. Stahl et al. 2013; Lin 2014; Guerrieri et al. 2015). In 
a layered architecture system, a technology of one type operates over a technology of another type (see 
Figure 1a). Lower layers technologies provide services to the higher layers. However, higher layer 
technologies are different and independent of the designs of the lower layer ones (Raghavan and Garcia-
Molina 2001). Accordingly, the higher layer technologies employ the lower layers to facilitate concurrency 
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control, recovery, caching, index structures, etc. Although layered architectures reduce the need of 
extensive development time and effort, mapping the data types and operators used by the higher layer 
technologies to the data types and operators of the lower layer ones is problematic (Raghavan and Garcia-
Molina 2001, p. 45).  
 
Figure 1. Common Integration Architectures (Adopted from Raghavan and Garcia-Molina, 
2001) 
Extension architecture systems are proposed as a solution where the system uses extension modules to 
enhance the capabilities of the heterogeneous technologies (see Figure 1c). These extension modules 
provide support for new data types, operators, or query languages that are available in other technologies. 
In humanitarian organization settings, mapping the data types and operators or adding the extensions are 
difficult due to the number of organizations involved in the collaboration process and the dynamicity of 
the coalitions of humanitarian organizations. 
Loosely coupled architectures separate the integration process with an isolated integration layer (see 
Figure 1b). The integration layer provides an integrated access interface to the connected technologies by 
utilizing special data and query languages. This model does not require complex modifications to the 
individual technologies. However, it necessitates developing efficient mechanisms to translate the queries 
expressed in the integration layer for each individual technology. Our choice of the loosely coupled 
architecture is due to the presumption that the SHISA is ubiquitously available on the time of crisis. It just 
requires humanitarian organizations to register their users and gain their users’ certificates to start 
communicating among each other.  
The Secure Humanitarian Information Sharing Architecture 
General Approach 
Our proposed artifact comprises a loosely coupled mediator-wrapper that allows the heterogeneous 
humanitarian technologies to exchange qualitative data and reports. The mediator (the integration layer) 
provides an abstract integrated view of the data to be exchanged. It acts like the centralized location from 
which users can query documents. Query responses are provided as secured XML documents that can be 
mapped to the organization’s local database system automatically (Huesemann 2002). At the 
humanitarian organization side, the technical implementations are simpler. Therefore, our framework 
solves the issue of requiring special technical expertise and expensive technologies to collaborate in 
response to crisis. In terms of mechanisms to translate the queries for each individual technology, our 
artifact uses a standardized XML schema and enforces access control by using mechanisms of indexing 
and impersonation as discussed below.  
In humanitarian organizations, heterogeneity of technologies is commonplace. For example, one 
organization might have its data in a relational database and use SQL to tap into the data, while another 
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organization is using a document management application from which users can access the documents 
according to their tasks. Furthermore, collaborating organizations may employ multilevel security policies 
or multilevel security goals.  These diverse systems and policies provide obstacles to the mediating system 
that is used to aggregate the data. For example, the file system will control access at the file level while the 
relational database will control access at the data element or field level. Consequently, a unified access 
control model is necessary. 
The data aggregator level uses a search engine that crawls each organization’s databases. In order to 
provide a quick and relevant response to authorized users when inquiring documents, the search engine 
will index the documents that are to be shared by the humanitarian organization. Once a user submits a 
query, the search engine will refer to the global index instead of the actual document. This is analogous to 
searching in a catalogue instead of searching through the actual items (Mudgil et al. 2013).  
The documents in the index have varying permission levels. An approach to accommodate this variety of 
permissions can be to have a global permission set that is identified at the search engine level. This is 
difficult because it requires a global level administrator to define the access rights for the individual 
catalogued document. In humanitarian environment, this approach is impractical for three reasons: 1) 
applying a common permission set to documents among heterogeneous systems is impossible; 2) it 
requires a duplicate effort of redefining an already defined permission set on the documents collected; 
and 3) it requires the admin to have knowledge of access control for each organization involved, which is 
inconceivable (Lempel et al. 2013). Accordingly, the search engine should honor the documents’ 
permissions set that is identified in the original database. This is achieved by using the original access 
control list (ACL), which is a table that lists the documents, the project/task that the documents are 
generated for, and the users’ or groups’ permission on these documents.  
A technique for honoring original ACL in our framework is impersonation. Impersonation in this context 
means that once a query is submitted, the search engine will contact the original database server to check 
if the requesting user has permission to view the file before returning the results. This helps in reflecting 
the most recent ACL permissions since the filtering of the query results happen in real time (Lempel et al. 
2013). The following two subsection illustrate SHISA in more detail.  The first subsection introduces the 
information exchange standard (IdmlReporting), and the second discusses the data aggregator and its 
content. 
The Exchange Standard: IdmlReporting  
The standard (idmlReporting) is used to suffice the information needs of the different technologies and to 
standardize the access control levels. idmlReporting (see Figure 2) is based on the International 
Development Markup Language (IDML). IDML is already in use for qualitative (project) information 
sharing by organizations such as the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), and the United Nations (UN). IDML is based on XML and uses special tags and 
rules for humanitarian projects. The core activity schema includes project information such as the project 
titles, the project stakeholders and their roles, the people involved, and funding details. Some of these 
elements are generic and apply to any project, but others are specific to international development 
projects such as funding and organizationsInvolved. Funding, for example, can come from 
different donors and can go to different organizations, as they are involved in the humanitarian project. 
Accordingly, IDML attributes make it different from profit-oriented projects (Huesemann 2006).  
Although IDML was designed to allow the exchanging of high-level descriptions of activities, it cannot 
give detailed project reports and evaluations. Therefore, idmlReporting schema was proposed, which 
includes four major reusable components: 1) Detailed Description, 2) Reporting, 3) Evaluation, and 4) 
Financial Information. Our framework adds a root to idmlReporting, the projectId, since 
idmlReporting generally allows reporting on one project, whereas our platform is generic for all 
humanitarian projects and allows multiple projects to be reported at once. The idmlReporting is rooted 
with the reportsAndEvaluations as the container for the rest of the schema elements. This means 
that each project will have the main element reportsAndEvaluations, which comprises limitless 
reportAndEvaluation elements. Each reportAndEvaluation element is a complex type 
reportType, which can contain mixed contents (broken frame in Figure 2). The reportType includes 
detailedDescription, evaluation, reporting, financialInformation, and metadata on the 
report (e.g. number, name, date, description) (Huesemann 2006).  
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Figure 2. idmlReporting Standard Schema 
detailedDescription further contains detailed information about a project like background, 
expectedOutcome, beneficiary, objective, problem, risk, strategicApproach, milestone, 
and relatedDocument (see Figure 3). The list of complex elements and their components can be found 
in the detailed documentation for IDML and IdmlReporting provided by Huesemann (Huesemann 2017). 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 are just snapshots of the schema to show that IdmlReporting contains all the 
elements/keywords that represent the required data for collaboration among the organizations. The 
processes of querying and controlling access in SHISA are managed on the fine-grained level of these 
elements. Therefore, idmlReporting helps in achieving decomposing a document into those elements and 
querying only some parts of the document. 
The collaborating humanitarian organizations will map their documents to the idmlReporting schema. 
This can happen automatically if the organization has a relational database (Huesemann 2002). 
Otherwise, the crawler of the search engine will have a programmed mechanism to go through the 
documents and find the keywords that match the elements specified in the schema. The details of code are 
out of the scope of our paper.  
 
Figure 3. detailedDescriptionType Elements 
In summary, the proposed XML schema will act as the set of comprehensive standardized data elements 
to be exchanged. idmlReporting predefines all the elements/keywords that represent the data required for 
collaboration among the humanitarian organizations. For relational databases, the predetermined 
elements are mapped to the tables’ fields. Conversely, for document management applications, the 
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predefined elements will act as the keywords for the search query used for decomposition. Through this 
process, the access controls that were originally at the file level in the organization’s local database will be 
converted to the element level at the mediator, thus standardizing the system.  
Architecture of the Data Aggregator 
The data aggregator side represents the global level mediator that facilitates the collaboration and 
information exchange among the organizations. It includes an attribute authority (AA), a global role 
manager, search server that includes a global search engine and a search index database, a database that 
hosts the responses to queries, and the XML generator that translates the documents into idmlReporting 
schema (see Figure 4).   
In order for a user to request information from the data aggregator, the user must be authenticated and 
authorized to ensure an end-to-end secured communication. A standard that incorporates mechanisms of 
both authentication and authorization is the 4th edition of X.509, referred to as the Privilege Management 
Infrastructure (PMI) (SANS Institute 2001). PMI attaches an entity with privileges through Attribute 
Certificates (ACs). As shown in Table 1, an AC includes information about the version of the certificate, 
the certificate holder, the issuer (the Attribute Authority AA), a serial number to identify the certificate, a 
unique identifier of the AA, attributes associated with the holder, extensions (optional) to add information 
to the AC, and the signature of the AA to ensure the validity of the certificate. In our framework, the 
extension field holds the projectId element to show for which project this AC is generated and to which 
project this user is assigned this role. The extension (projectId) is needed because, at any point, an 
organization can be collaborating for different projects, and in each project a user might have a different 
role. This is due to the dynamic nature of cooperation between humanitarian organizations.  
 
Figure 4. SHISA Architecture 
Version 
S
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re
 
Serial Number 
Signature ID 
Holder (user) X.500 General Name 
Issuer (AA) X.500 General Name  
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Verify Period 
Attribute (role) 
Extension (project ID) 
Table 1. Attribute Certificate (AC) Content 
For trust purposes, PMI requires an entity with the ultimate authority to be responsible for assigning 
privileges and will be trusted across the whole system – the so-called Source of Authority (SOA), which is 
the AA in our model. Since our framework connects disparate organizations that are in different 
geographical areas, the role management is a hierarchical model of role assignment. At the data 
aggregator, the role manager is responsible for creating standard roles with standard permissions per 
schema element. Permissions are “visible and edit.” Visible specifies the visibility of the element to the 
role, and edit specifies if the role can edit the element information or not. For example, from Table 2, the 
financial analyst can see and edit risk. Although milestone is an element of detailedDescription, it 
is set as invisible and is consequently not editable.  When access control is enforced, the system will use 
the lowest level of the element’s (i.e. milestone) permission and will override the higher-level 
permissions (i.e. detailedDescription).  Therefore, the financial analyst will see risk information 
but not milestone information when requesting a detailed description of the project Hurricane Katrina 
(see Tables 2 and 3). 
Standard roles and their privileges are identified by the global role manager, and each organization 
assigns its users locally to the standard roles to define their privileges. Once the user is assigned to a role, 
the organization’s role manager contacts the AA to register the user and to obtain a user certificate. 
Obtained certificates are saved locally in an LDAP directory so that certificate revocation lists become 
unnecessary. Simply, a revoked certificate will be deleted from the LDAP folder. The choice of the Role 
Based Access Control (RBAC) is because of its ability to simplify controlling the access when the number 
of users is large or when the collaboration is dynamic (i.e. stakeholders can join the project or drop from 
the project during the project progress).  
XML Schema Element Visible Edit 
detailedDescription •  
               milestone   
       risk • • 
Table 2. ACL for Financial Analyst Project1 
Subject constraints are per file in the local ACL and per element in the global search index ACL. As shown 
in the tables, although the financial analyst can access DOC1 of project1, s/he will not be able to access the 
milestone information within that document. Since the global (element) ACL does not allow this role to 
access the element based on the profile privileges specified for project1. The financial analyst is also not 
allowed to access the risk element of DOC1 in project2 because of their profile. Although the access is 
granted at the local level, it is not granted at the element level globally. The ACL represents granting the 
access action only. When access is not explicitly granted, it is assumed to be denied. This embodies the 
implicit deny rule in security (Carlos et al. 2001). 
Document 
ID 
ProjectID Issuing 
Organization 
Roles allowed  
DOC1  Project 1(Hurricane Katrina) Red Cross administrator, financialAnalyst  
DOC2  Project 1(Hurricane Katrina) Red Cross administrator, projectMngr 
DOC 1 Project 2 (Haiti development) Red Cross administrator, financialAnalyst 
Table 3. Local Organization's ACL 
Element Project ID Roles allowed 
risk Project 1 (Hurricane Katrina) administrator, financialAnalyst, 
projectMngr 
milestone Project 1 (Hurricane Katrina) administrator, projectMngr 
risk Project 2 (Haiti development) administrator, riskAnalyst. 
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Table 4. Element Level ACL 
As mentioned above, the role of having a search engine is to retrieve the documents from an 
organizational database and to provide relevant responses to search queries submitted by users. For 
performance purposes, the search engine builds an index which embodies the corpus of documents that 
the humanitarian organizations are willing to exchange. Furthermore, the index facilitates avoiding 
duplicate documents.  
To build the index, the search engine uses a crawler to scan the documents in the collaborating 
organizations’ databases with the role of administrator (or super-user) that is sufficient to access all the 
repositories. The crawler not only retrieves the content information of a document, but also retrieves meta 
data about the document such as author, project ID, and project name, among others. This information 
will be parsed, tokenized, and ingested by an indexer into the index. If the organization uses a relational 
database, the organization’s fields will be mapped automatically to the idmlReporting schema elements. 
However, if the organization uses another file management system, the crawler will add another step to 
searching the text in the document; it will map the document content to the schema elements using a text 
to XML mapping software. Once the documents and their contents are retrieved, the search engine stores 
cross reference of the document’s elements in the index data repository. This process of crawling is 
periodic so that the index repository is always up-to-date with the documents that are in the 
organizations’ databases. 
SHISA Functioning 
The variety of management packages makes it hard, if not impossible, to come up with a common access 
control structure. SHISA honors the native original access control policies, but globally it controls the 
access on the document elements based on users’ profiles.  
A collaborating user must be registered in the system and have obtained a certificate specifying their role. 
When a user submits a query, the search engine matches the query keywords with the indexed elements 
and generates an interim pre-filtered search result. Once a document is part of a search result, the search 
engine contacts the originating database with the requesting user’s role to check if the role is authorized. 
The organization’s server responds to the search engine with an answer of granted or denied access. If 
denied, the document will be eliminated from the interim result, however, if access is granted, the search 
engine will then check ACL per each document element. If access to a document is granted but an element 
is set to not visible, then the document will be returned with the element eliminated. The process of 
generating the index is what we refer to as indexing, and the process of contacting each organization to 
filter the interim result based on the user’s role is impersonation. 
Once a search result document and its elements are finalized, the resulting documents will be requested 
from the owner organizations’ databases. At the data aggregator level, the documents will be parsed to the 
final elements that the requesting user is authorized to retrieve. An XML generator then uses mapping 
and conversion rules to map the information to the idmlReporting schema to generate an XML document. 
The document then is encrypted using the public key of the local web server of the organization that 
represents the requesting user. Finally, the encrypted document is sent to the user. 
For the search engine to implement impersonation, the user must present their AC along with the query. 
The user logs into the local organization’s web server, the web server authenticates the user, and contacts 
the local role manager to retrieve the user’s certificate from the certificate repository (the LDAP certificate 
server). Once the user is authenticated and the certificate is retrieved, the local web server will act as the 
only entry/exit point to and from the organization and will submit the query to the global search engine 
on behalf of the user. The local web server also attaches the requesting user certificate for the search 
engine to perform impersonation. The reasoning behind placing certificates in a centralized certificate 
repository to each organization is to reduce the probability of a certificate being tempered or stolen due to 
users’ unintentional security threats. Furthermore, the reason of using a single entry/exit point at each 
organization is to reduce the complexity of key pair management. Instead of having thousands or more of 
key, each organization will have only a single key pair to be managed in SHISA.  
Conclusion 
Secured information exchange among humanitarian organizations is essential when responding to crisis. 
Yet, effective communication faces challenges resulting from the heterogeneity of the technologies in 
place and the dynamicity of the teams. Heterogeneity in this context means that organizations are using 
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different technologies, different standards, software, protocols, and security levels, among others. 
Furthermore, coalitions need to be set up swiftly and they are dynamic in that cooperating organization 
can join or withdraw during the project progress based on their tasks. Consequently, preparation and 
planning among the organizations is challenging.  
Issues that result from heterogeneity and dynamicity can vary, among them are the necessity of 
standardizing the data elements that need to be exchanged, authenticating and authorizing users to 
ensure an end-to-end secure communication, and standardizing the level of access control to the data 
elements. This paper provides a pre-configured platform (SHISA), which humanitarian organizations can 
utilize to collaborate promptly when responding to crisis. The artifact standardizes the data elements 
using a predefined XML schema, idmlReporting. For authentication and authorization, the artifact 
utilizes attribute certificates specified in the 4th edition X.509 standard. Attribute certificates not only 
validate a user’s identity but attach their roles as well, so that the system can authorize the users before 
responding to their information queries. Finally, to enforce the access control policies, our artifact uses 
the processes of indexing and impersonation. Indexing refers to the process of going through each 
organization’s database and index all their documents corresponding to the standardized elements 
(keywords) specified in idmlReporting. Impersonation refers to the process of honoring the native access 
control policies specified at the originating database.  
Our artifact closes the gap in the literature of not only facilitating the communication among 
heterogeneous systems, but also securing the communication, which is as important as facilitating the 
communication itself. It is also beneficial for humanitarian organizations in solving the issues of secured 
communication within the limited resources available in place based on available technologies that can be 
accommodated without requiring unique technical skills.  
So far, we progressed through the first three stages of design science as presented by Peffers et al. (2007) 
that are: (1) identification of the problem and motivation, (2) defining the objectives of the artifact and 
solution, and (3) presenting the conceptual artifact that synthesizing solutions to the individual problems 
listed. Our plan is to complete the process in future work by demonstrating detailed scenarios of the 
artifact and show how it solves the problems mentioned. We then will evaluate the model using Delphi 
Survey methodology as guided by Hasson et al. (2000). 
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